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1 Introduction
Recently Mankiw and Reis (2002) have proposed a sticky-informationmodel (SIM) of expecta-
tions formation that supposes that agents update their expectations periodically, due to the costs
of acquiring and processing information, rather than continuously, as implied by the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis (REH). Their SIM is applied by Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) to the
analysis of disagreement amongst forecasters, and more recently by Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2008), while Carroll (2005) provides an epidemiological foundation for the model - the acquisition
of the latest information is akin to the spread of a disease through a population. First and fore-
most, the sticky-information model explains the prevalence of disagreement amongst forecasters:
the REH assumes that all agents have access to all relevant information and know the structure
of the economy, and so have identical expectations. Mankiw et al. (2003) regard the SIM as a
halfway house between the REH, which assumes too much of agents, and the oft-used alternative
of adaptive expectations (AE), which assumes too little (because agents are expected to draw on
information other than lags of the variable of interest when they formulate their expectations).
Whereas the island modelof Lucas (Lucas (1973)) also generates disagreement among agents, the
level of disagreement is determined independently of the state of the macroeconomy. By way of
contrast, the SIM is capable of explaining the empirical nding that the level of disagreement is
endogenously determined (see, e.g., Mankiw et al. (2003)).
However, there are of course a number of other explanations of disagreement, so that it would be
wrong to suppose that the existence of disagreement lends support to the SIM. For example, Lahiri
and Sheng (2008) allow disagreement about i) forecastersinitial beliefs, ii) the weights attached to
these prior beliefs, and iii) the interpretation of public information, while Patton and Timmermann
(2008) stress prior beliefs and individuals receiving di¤erent signals. Both of these studies follow
Carroll (2003, 2005) and others in supposing that professional forecasters pay attention to news
and base their forecasts on the latest information available to them.
By and large, the literature views the SIM as possibly being relevant for laymen but not for
professional forecasters. This is most clearly evident in Carroll (2003) who supposes that the
forecasts of professionals embody the latest news and information, and that information is gradually
di¤used to laymen (e.g., respondents to consumer surveys) according to the sticky information
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model. However this view has not gone unchallenged, and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) nd
no evidence that consumers and professional forecasters update their forecasts at di¤erent rates.
In this paper we present a novel way of assessing the validity of the SIM for professional
forecasters. Specically, the question we ask is whether professional forecasters are attentive to
the latest news about the macroeconomy when they form their expectations. The answer is that
professional forecasters, taken as a group, do not always update their estimates of the current
state of the economy to reect the latest releases of revised estimates of key data. As ever when
testing a theory of expectations formation a number of auxiliary assumptions need to be made.
Our assessment of the SIM is not di¤erent in this respect, although the assumptions we make are
arguably relatively weak, and at least in part testable. We are careful to consider other possible
explanations for the empirical ndings that are taken as support for the SIM. By and large the
SIM appears to be the most plausible explanation.
The basis of our assessment of the SIM is very simple. Suppose in the third quarter of the year,
a forecast is made of the third and fourth quarter values of a variable y. The current quarter -
the third quarter - will need to be forecast, as data for the third quarter will not be available until
the next quarter. But the forecaster will have access to estimates of the rst and second quarter
values of y. The forecaster reports their quarterly forecasts y3 and y4, and the value for the second
quarter, y2. They also report a forecast of the annual value, x. Under some assumptions, if the
forecaster is attentive to the latest data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, then the sum
of the reported values,
P4
i=2 yi, plus the latest estimate of y1 available at the time the forecasts
are made, y31 (i.e., the third-quarter vintage value of the variable in quarter one) should equal the
forecast of the annual value. Suppose instead the annual forecast is based on the second-quarter
estimate of y1, namely, y21. If we now (mistakenly) assume the forecaster uses y
3
1, we would nd
a discrepancy between the annual and quarterly forecasts, i.e.,  = x   (y31 +
P4
i=2 yi), which is
negatively correlated with the data revision, y31   y21, the di¤erence between the vintage estimates
of the rst quarter available in the third quarter and in the second quarter. If the forecaster were
attentive, the correlation would be zero, and  would on average be zero. It would only di¤er from
zero because of idiosyncratic errors: reporting errors, rounding errors, etc.
The key assumption we make is that the forecasts satisfy the national accounts identity: the
sum of the forecasts of the future quarters and the estimates of the past quarters sum to the forecast
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of the year. We discuss why this condition might not hold, and present evidence that suggests it
does hold for our sample. We also consider the possibility that the forecaster assumes that y31 will
be revised, and reports an annual forecast x which is consistent with their estimate of the rst
quarter value.
The majority of the literature on the SIM focuses on ination, but we supplement this by
drawing on evidence for a broad range of macroeconomic variables. These include real GDP and
its major components drawn from the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). There is
no reason to believe a priori that ination expectations are generated di¤erently from expectations
of other key variables, so we draw on a range of variables.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 details our approach to testing
forecaster attentiveness to new data releases. Section 3 allows that forecasters might attempt to
predict the revised values of past data, and considers how this will a¤ect the interpretation of our
tests for attentiveness. Section 4 describes the forecast dataset. Section 5 reports the results of the
empirical tests, and section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Testing forecaster attentiveness to data releases
The key assumption we make is that the forecast of the annual value is equal to the average of the
forecasts of the corresponding quarters.1 Although this might appear to be a mild assumption,2
it need not hold, as it requires that the forecasters report as their predictions their conditional
expectations. This rules out asymmetric loss: see e.g., Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2008).
We nd that to the extent that we can assess the validity of this assumption it appears to hold
by and large. As we explain below, adding upcan be tested for the responses to the Q1 and Q2
surveys, but is not testable for the Q3 and Q4 surveys. But there seems no reason why forecasters
should behave di¤erently in this regard depending on the survey quarter.
First we need to introduce some notation. Let xi;t;k be the annual forecast of the year t value
of x made by individual i at time k, where k is one of the four quarters of year t (k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g).
Let yi;t;j;k be the forecast of the value of the variable in quarter j of year t, made at the time
1The forecasts SPF forecasts of GDP and its components are reported at annual rates, so the annual values are
averages rather than sums. We drop this in the exposition for simplicity.
2Patton and Timmermann (2008) make the same assumption in their analysis of the term-structure of forecast
disagreement.
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of quarter k (again by individual i). Note that yi;t;j;k with j = k will denote a current-quarter
forecast, as the rst estimate of yt;j will not be available until j + 1. Similarly, xi;t;4 is also a
forecast. The quantities xt and yt;j without the individual and forecast origin subscripts denote
the actual values. Superscripts denote the data vintage, when necessary, so that x;qt and y
;q
t;j are
the estimates of xt and yt;j in the data vintage of year  , quarter q. The annual and quarterly
data satisfy x;qt =
P4
j=1 y
;q
t;j by construction. We usually economize on notation for same year
vintages by writing say, y3t;1 to denote the third-quarter vintage estimate of the value of y in the
rst quarter of the year (rather than the more cumbersome yt;3t;1). We make use of the Real-time
data sets of Croushore and Stark (2001), because these match up with the SPF in the sense that
the latest data on y available at the time a respondent les a return to the kth quarter of year t
survey is given in the corresponding real-time dataset, consisting of ykt;k 1, y
k
t;k 2,. . . (where e.g.,
k   1 < 0 or k   2 < 0 indexes a quarter from an earlier year, etc.). Hence these datasets provide
the actual data that would have been available to the survey members each time they responded
to a particular survey.
The nature of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data revisions is such that yj+2t;j is
always revised relative to yj+1t;j . y
j+1
t;j is the BEA advance estimate, and y
j+2
t;j is known as the BEA
nalestimate. The data are then unrevised except for three annual revisions in the July of each
year: see, e.g., Fixler and Grimm (2005, 2008) and Landefeld, Seskin and Fraumeni (2008). Hence
yj+3t;j = y
j+2
t;j except when j + 3 is a third quarter (so when the data relate to the fourth quarter
of the year, i.e., j 2 Q4). Exceptions to this rule may occur when there are benchmark revisions.
Hence the nature of the data revisions process creates the possibility that inattentive forecasters
will base their predictions on out-dated estimates of some of the quarterly values.
Our approach rests on the nature of the SPF questionnaire and how the information it provides
on current-year quantities implicitly changes depending on the quarter of the year in which the
survey is held (see Zarnowitz (1969), Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) and Croushore (1993) for details
of the SPF). Specically, respondents are asked to provide forecasts of the previous quarter, the
current quarter, and each of the next four quarters (so up to and including a forecast of the same
quarter in the following year) as well as forecasts for the current and following year. Respondents
are not told what to report. They are provided with an estimate of the previous quarters value.
Bearing this in mind, consider the surveys held in the rst quarter of the year (k = 1). The
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econometrician will observe yi;t;j;1, j = 1; 2; 3; 4 and xi;t;1 for all respondents i. Hence we can
calculate i;t;1 = xi;t;1  
P4
j=1 yi;t;j;1 for all i. Because for the Q1 surveys the forecasts of all
the quarters are reported, we can see whether adding upholds, or more generally whether the
discrepancies are zero-mean and unsystematic, once we allow for reporting and rounding errors.
Whether the forecasters are fully attentive or not is irrelevant to the calculation of i;t;1. A similar
situation prevails for Q2 surveys (k = 2), i;t;2 = xi;t;2  
P4
j=1 yi;t;j;2, as respondents report values
for the four quarters of the year. Forecasts from these two origins are not informative (within our
approach) about the SIM, but are used to assess the underlying assumption that the quarters sum
to the annual totals.
Consider now the forecasts made from the third-quarter survey, as discussed in the introduction.
Let y^i;t;1;3 denote is value for the rst quarter, which is unreported and hence unknown to the
econometrician, whereas the forecasts of the other three quarters are reported. We calculate i;t;3
assuming that y^i;t;1;3 = y3t;1, and denote this by i;t;3
 
y3t;1

, so that:
i;t;3
 
y3t;1
  xi;t;3  
0@y3t;1 + 4X
j=2
yi;t;j;3
1A :
Under the null that the forecaster pays attention to data releases and conditions their forecasts on
y3t;1, we would expect adding up to hold apart perhaps from an idiosyncratic error ("i;t;3, which
reects reporting/rounding/computational errors), so that:
H0 : E

i;t;3
 
y3t;1
 j Zt;3 = 0 (1)
given that i;t;3
 
y3t;1

= "i;t;3. Zt;3 contains variables known at the time of the survey. Under
the null, the discrepancy  should not be systematically related to these variables. The obvious
candidate variables are simply the public releases of estimates of yt;1, i.e.,

y3t;1; y
2
t;1
	
.
Under the alternative, the forecaster uses an earlier estimate of yt;1, say y^i;t;1;3 = y2t;1. Sup-
pose i;t;3
 
y2t;1

= xi;t;3  

y2t;1 +
P4
j=2 yi;t;j;3

= "i;t;3, so that adding up holds using y2t;1 for this
inattentive respondent. Under this alternative:
H1 : E

i;t;3
 
y3t;1
 j  y3t;1   y2t;1 < 0 (2)
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because i;t;3
 
y3t;1

= "i;t;3  
 
y3t;1   y2t;1

,3 and where we have used Zt;3 = y3t;1   y2t;1. This is the
obvious choice of Zt;3 when the inattentiveness takes the form of the forecaster using y2t;1 in place
of y3t;1. For this choice of Zt we have an unambiguous prediction of the sign of the correlation being
negative.
Forecasts from fourth-quarter surveys also allow an assessment of whether full use is made of
the latest information. Respondents report values for the third and fourth quarters. We calculate
the discrepancies assuming the estimates for the rst two quarters are drawn from the data vintage
available at the time the forecasts are led, namely, y4t;1 and y
4
t;2:
i;t;4
 
y4t;1; y
4
t;2

= xi;t;4  
0@y4t;1 + y4t;2 + 4X
j=3
yi;t;j;4
1A :
Suppose the forecaster used out-dated information, say y3t;1 and y
3
t;2, in place of y
4
t;1 and y
4
t;2.
As explained, the nature of the BEA revisions process is such that y4t;2   y3t;2 is non-zero, but
y4t;1   y3t;1 = 0. Under the null of attentiveness we have:
H0 : E

i;t;4
 
y4t;1; y
4
t;2
 j Zt;4 = 0 (3)
whereas for a one-quarterinattentive forecaster with i;t;4(y3t;1; y
3
t;2) = "i;t;4, we have:
H1 : E

i;t;4
 
y4t;1; y
4
t;2
 j  y4t;2   y3t;2 < 0: (4)
We have assumed in this section that the inattentive forecaster uses y2t;1 in place of y
3
t;1 when
responding to a third-quarter survey, and y3t;2 instead of y
4
t;2 for fourth-quarter surveys. We show in
the following section that this is simply for expositional purposes, and that the results are unchanged
if instead the forecaster provides an estimate of yt;1 or yt;2 based on out-dated data releases. In
the next section we consider a potentially more serious objection, which is that respondents may
estimate future vintage values (of say, y3t;1, in the case of the third-quarter surveys) having observed
the latest data release.
3To obtain this expression, simply subtract
 
y3t;1   y2t;1

from both sides of i;t;3
 
y2t;1

= "i;t;3.
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3 Respondents forecast revisions to past data
We distinguish between respondents who provide their own estimates of future releases of past data
based on the latest available data estimates (attentive forecasters) and those who provide their own
estimates in ignorance of the latest o¢ cial statistics.
3.1 Attentive forecasters
A possible objection to our approach is that the Q3-survey forecaster may not take y3t;1 at face
value. If it were the case that statistical agencies (such as the BEA) produced data estimates
which were not e¢ cient, in the sense that subsequent revisions to these data were predictable,
then some respondents might report forecasts (annual and quarterly) that are consistent on the
basis of their estimates of the post-revisionvalues of past data, rather than the latest publically
available values at the time of the survey return. In this section we consider the implications of
this behaviour for our assessment of attentiveness, and whether there is any evidence to indicate
that the respondents do attempt to forecast data revisions.
As discussed by Croushore (2011), a government statistical agency would produce noisy esti-
mates, whereby the revision between vintages is correlated with the earlier data release, if it simply
reports its sample information. Producing an optimal estimate that adds newsrequires the use
of judgment and subjective proceduresthat the agency may shy away from. The empirical evi-
dence on the nature of revisions is mixed (again see Croushore (2011)), with Mankiw and Shapiro
(1986) nding that GDP revisions add news but more recently Aruoba (2008) concluding that such
revisions are predictable.
We illustrate in the context of the Q3 survey quarter. Suppose the respondents estimate of yt;1 is
y^t;1;3 (dropping the i subscript for convenience). If attentive, then y^t;1;3 = y3t;1, and t;3
 
y3t;1

= "t;3.
For a general y^t;1;3, the econometrician calculates t;3
 
y3t;1

= "t;3  
 
y3t;1   y^t;1;3

. Of concern is
that the attentiveforecaster who uses the estimate y^t;1;3 in place of y3t;1 might be mistaken for an
inattentive forecaster, as would occur in our approach if using an estimate induces a correlation
between t;3
 
y3t;1

and Zt;3.
Suppose the investigator uses Zt;3 = y3t;1   y2t;1, then we have:
Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

= Cov
 
"t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1
  Cov  y3t;1   y^t;1;3; y3t;1   y2t;1
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where Cov
 
"t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

= 0 by the assumption that "t;3 is an idiosyncratic error. To evaluate
the second term, write y3t;1   y^t;1;3 = (yt;1   y^t;1;3) +
 
y3t;1   yt;1

. The rst term is the error in the
respondents own estimate of the post-revision value (yt;1), and the second term is (minus) the error
in the latest-data release value as a prediction of the post-revision value. It follows that yt;1  y^t;1;3
is orthogonal to

y3t;1; y
2
t;1
	
if y^t;1;3 is an e¢ cient forecast of the post-revisionvalue yt;1 using an
information set that includes

y3t;1; y
2
t;1
	
. Assuming y^t;1;3 is an e¢ cient forecast,
Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

= Cov
 
yt;1   y3t;1; y3t;1   y2t;1

so that the correlation between t;3
 
y3t;1

and Zt;3 will depend on the nature of the BEA data releases
and does not depend on the respondents forecast. Under noise, the data revisions yt;1   y3t;1 and
y3t;1   y2t;1 will typically be correlated.
In summary, if data revisions are noise, then revised estimates of earlier-vintage estimates are
in principle predictable. If a forecaster bases their survey response of the current-year quarterly
and annual values on their own estimate of the future vintage value of past quarterly value(s),
then we would nd a non-zero correlation.4 This suggests care in the interpretation of a nding
of a non-zero correlation. However, because the respondents to each survey are asked to provide
estimates for the value of the previous quarter, we can assess whether respondents tend to provide
their own estimates or simply report the o¢ cial gure. A casual examination of the data suggests
that forecasters tend to report the o¢ cial gure as their estimate of the previous quarter, and this
is borne out by formal testing in section 5. This may suggest they are not interested in reporting
the nalvalue, or that they believe the rst estimate to be an unbiased forecast of the nal value.
This does not rule out the possibility that respondents to a Q3 survey base their forecast return on
their own estimate of the Q1 value, but there is no obvious reason why they should take the o¢ cial
Q2 gure at face value yet forecast the Q1 value.
3.2 Inattentive forecasters
We show that inattentive forecasters who use estimates of past data will (correctly) show up as
inattentive irrespective of the properties of data revisions. We again illustrate with the Q3 survey
4Note that it is irrelevant whether the reported annual and quarterly forecasts are of the rst-release values, or
whether they target a later release. Hence for the Q1 and Q2 surveys, for which all the quarterly values are reported,
it is immaterial what vintage is being targetted in terms of assessing whether the forecasts add up.
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quarter. Suppose the respondents estimate of yt;1 is eyt;1;3, where their inattentiveness is manifest
in the conditioning of the estimate on out-dated data, say, eyt;1;3 = E  yt;1 j y2t;1. Then t;3  y3t;1 =
"t;3  
 
y3t;1   eyt;1;3. With Zt;3 = y3t;1   y2t;1, we have:
Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

= Cov
 
"t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1
  Cov  y3t;1   eyt;1;3; y3t;1   y2t;1 (5)
Firstly, suppose data revisions are news. Then the best an inattentive but e¢ cientforecaster
can do is eyt;1;3 = y2t;1, and so:
Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

=  V ar  y3t;1   y2t;1 :
Secondly, suppose that revisions are noise, and therefore predictable to some degree.
Then we can write eyt;1;3 = y2t;1 + t, and substituting into (5) results in:
Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

=  V ar  y3t;1   y2t;1+ Cov  t; y3t;1   y2t;1 (6)
In the extreme case that t = y3t;1   y2t;1 then Cov
 
t;3; y
3
t;1   y2t;1

= 0. The interpretation is that
when revisions are perfectly predictable, eyt;1;3 = y3t;1, it is obviously irrelevant whether forecasters
are inattentiveor not. Given that revisions are not perfectly predictable, our approach will signal
inattentive forecasters by a negative correlation whether they use an earlier-vintage value, or an
estimate of their own based on an earlier-vintage data release.
4 Data
We consider variables forecast by the SPF respondents to the 1981:3 survey through to the 2008:4
survey. Although the SPF5 began in 1968, prior to the 1981:3 survey, forecasts were not reported for
real GDP. Because it is a survey of professional forecasters, authors such as Keane and Runkle (1990)
have argued that one can reasonably assume that the reported forecasts reect the forecasters
expectations, which might not be true when ordinary individuals and rms are surveyed. We
5The survey was originally the ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians, administered by the
American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Since June 1990
it has been run by the Philadelphia Fed, renamed as the SPF - Survey of Professional Forecasters: see Zarnowitz
(1969), Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) and Croushore (1993).
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consider only the forecasts made by regular respondents6. Table 1 lists the variables we study, their
SPF mnemonics, and also their codes in the Real-Time Data Sets for Macroeconomists (RTDSM)
(see Croushore and Stark (2001)). The variables are nominal and real GDP, and the GDP deator,
as well as real consumption and four measures of capital expenditure.
The SPF forecast data are provided as levels (rather than growth rates), and we analyse these
directly. As well as the regular data revisions, which are key to our test of attentiveness, there
are also benchmark revisions, reecting methodological changes in measurement or collection pro-
cedures, and which may also incorporate base-year changes. All the benchmark revisions bar two
occur in the rst quarters of the year. The revisions that take place in a rst quarter will have no
e¤ect on our assessments of attentiveness for any of the survey quarters of these years, as all the
forecasts are made on the new base-year data, and all the relevant data releases by the BEA for our
purposes are in terms of the new base. In principle, the benchmark revisions in the fourth quarters
of 1993 and 1994 should not be problematic either, in the sense that (1) and (3) should hold for
the third and fourth quarters for attentive forecasters. In 1993:Q3, for example, adding up holds
for the attentive forecaster using the y1993:Q31993:Q1 value for the rst quarter; but equally in 1993:Q4
adding up holds for the attentive forecaster using the y1993:Q41993:Q1 and y
1993:Q4
1993:Q2 values for the rst and
second quarters (albeit that these are now measured on the new basis). In practice, we nd that
the size of the benchmark revisions do appear to a¤ect our tests based on the fourth quarter survey
returns, as described in section 5.1.
5 Results
We rstly consider the evidence that bears on whether the quarterly forecasts sum to the annual
forecasts. Recall that for the surveys in the rst two quarters of each year, we have reported
quarterly values for all the four quarters of the year, as well as the annual (average). This is
because respondents report the quarterly levels for the previous quarter and the current quarter, as
well as future quarters. Table 2 reports selected percentiles of the distribution of the discrepancies
i;t across individuals and years for surveys in each quarter of the year. More precisely, we report
the distribution of the percentage discrepancy relative to a measure of the level of the variable, to
6Dened as those who led returns on at least 12 occasions.
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take account of changes in the levels of the variables over time from base-year changes.7
For the Q1 and Q2 surveys there is little evidence that the quarterly forecasts do not add up
to the annual totals. For example, for most of the variables we nd that 80% of the discrepancies
are around or less than 0.1 of a percent of the level in absolute value (that is, the 10 and 90%
percentiles are 0:1 of a percent). There is also some evidence that the discrepancies are larger for
the more volatile components such as investment, compared to consumption.
For the third quarter and fourth quarter surveys we calculate the discrepancies assuming that
respondents use the latest vintage estimates for quarters for which their survey returns do not
provide a value. That is, assuming the forecasters are attentive. So, for the third quarter surveys
we assume their forecasts are based upon the Q3 vintage estimate of the rst quarter, y3t;1, and
for the fourth quarter surveys, we assume their implicit values for the rst two quarters are y4t;1
and y4t;2. From table 2 it is apparent that the discrepancies are of a similar magnitude to those
for the rst two quarters. However, it would be wrong to take this as evidence that all forecasters
are attentive to the latest vintage estimates, and incorporate these into their forecasts, as we have
given no indication of the expected discrepancies that we would expect to nd if respondents used
earlier-vintage estimates.
A formal test of the null of attentiveness, which will have power to reject the null if respondents
do not incorporate latest-vintage estimates into their forecasts, is based on testing (1) and (3):
whether the discrepancies are systematically correlated with data revisions with the predicted sign.
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of 0 and 1 in the separate rst-quarter and second-quarter
survey regressions:
i;t;3 = 0 + 1
 
y3t;1   y2t;1

+ "i;t;3 (7)
and:
i;t;4 = 0 + 1
 
y4t;2   y3t;2

+ "i;t;4 (8)
as well as the p-values of the individual null hypotheses 0 = 0 and 1 = 0 (against two-sided
alternatives). These results are shown in the columns headed No scaling. The standard p-values
from estimating these regressions by OLS do not make any allowance for the fact that the "i;t;: from
7For the rst and second quarter surveys, we scale by the rst estimate of the variable for the previous quarter
(and multiply by one hundred), and for the third and fourth quarter surveys we take the rst estimate of the rst
and second quarters, respectively. The reason for the latter choice is so that the scaling of the discrepancy is by the
same variable as we use to scale the data revisions in the regressions that follow.
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a given survey, t, may be correlated across individuals because of common macroeconomic shocks or
other factors. To control for this we also estimate pooled regressions based on the approach of Keane
and Runkle (1990) and Bonham and Cohen (2001), see the appendix. The coe¢ cient estimates
are unchanged relative, and thus are not repeated, but the corrected p-values are recorded in the
table. The ndings are not especially sensitive to this, and for the third-quarter forecasts, we nd
that for 4 of the 8 variables the estimate of 1 is negative and the null that 1 = 0 is rejected
at conventional signicance levels. The rejection of the null in favour of a negative correlation
between the discrepancy and the data revision is consistent with inattentiveness. Note that this
occurs for the headlinemacroeconomic variable, real GDP. As a check on whether the base-year
changes over the sample period might have a¤ected the results, by causing heteroscedasticity in
the disturbances, we also estimated (7) and (8) with the discrepancies and revisions scaled by the
level of the variable (and multiplied by one hundred).8 The results are little a¤ected.
The results for the fourth quarter surveys (lower panel of table 3) o¤er little evidence against
attentiveness. The slope is signicantly di¤erent from zero for 3 of the variables using the corrected
standard errors (column (3)), but for only one of these variables is the slope negative. In section 5.1
we investigate the time-series properties of the two sets of revisions,

y3t;1   y2t;1
	
, and

y4t;2   y3t;2
	
,
to see whether these may account for the starkly di¤erent results between the third and fourth
quarter surveys reported in table 3.
5.1 Time series properties of the revisions series relevant for the tests based on
the third and fourth quarter surveys
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations of the two series of revisions

y3t;1   y2t;1
	
and
y4t;2   y3t;2
	
which underpin the tests of (1) and (3). The summary statistics are based on the 28
revisions over the period 1981 to 2008 in each case. The revisions relevant for the fourth quarter
surveys (y4t;2   y3t;2) are larger and more variable than those for the third quarter. However, as is
apparent from table 5 which provides the time series of the revisions, the fourth-quarter revisions
series contains two very large observations for each variable which correspond to the 1993 and
8For the Q3 surveys, the LHS and RHS variables are divided by y2t;1, so that the regressor becomes 100  
y3t;1   y2t;1

=y2t;1, the percentage revision in the value of the estimate for the rst quarter. For the Q4 surveys, we
divide by y3t;2, so the regressor again has the interpretation of being the percentage revision. As the same scaling is
used for the dependent variables, this accounts for our choice of denominator for the Q3 and Q4 survey discrepancies
in table 2.
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1999 benchmark revisions.9 It seems extremely unlikely that the respondents would not have been
aware of one-o¤revisions on the scale of those made in 1993 and 1994. At the same time, if we
exclude these two observations, the table shows that although the average size of the fourth-quarter
revisions was often on a par with the third-quarter revisions (see e.g., nominal and real output,
and consumption) the variability was only around a fth as large (as measured by the standard
deviation). Hence the two large benchmark revisions coupled with the relatively little variability
in the revisions faced by the fourth-quarter respondents o¤ers an explanation for the very di¤erent
results found for the third and fourth quarters in table 3 - there was insu¢ cient variability in the
latter case for inattentive forecasters to be detected.
5.2 Do survey respondents aim to produce forecasts which add up?
A key assumption underlying our analysis is that the forecast of the annual value is equal to the
average of the forecasts of the corresponding quarters. Table 6 reports the results of regressing i;t;1
and i;t;2 on a constant, as well as of carrying out this regression having rst scaled the variables.
We obtain similar results whether or not we scale the variables to account for the level shifts due
to re-basings. These regressions constitute a direct test of adding up for the responses to the rst
and second quarter surveys. For the scaled regressions using corrected standard errors there is no
evidence against adding up.
5.3 Do survey respondents attempt to second guess the o¢ cial national ac-
counts data?
We argued in section 3 that even attentive forecasters might generate non-zero correlations between
 and data revisions if they attempt to predict future revisions to the o¢ cial data releases. We do
not observe whether respondents to third and fourth quarter surveys provide their own estimates
of data pertaining to the rst and second quarters. However, for each survey, we do observe the
respondents estimates of the value for the previous quarter, and these can be compared to the
latest o¢ cial data. Table 7 reports the results of testing whether the di¤erences between the latest
o¢ cial estimates and the survey responses are signicantly di¤erent. We report the estimates of
9For real GDP, for example, the 1999 percentage fourth-quarter revision was 12%, compared to an average revision
over the period when 1993 and 1999 are excluded of just a half of one percentage point.
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the mean di¤erences, and p-values of whether this is signicantly di¤erent from zero (based on
corrected standard errors). In no cases are the means signicant at a conventional 5% level, which
suggests that there is no evidence against the hypothesis that respondents take the o¢ cial statistics
at face value.
Of course, these tests would only reject the null if respondents forecasted future revisions and
revisions were non-zero mean. The evidence in Aruoba (2008) suggests that there is strong evidence
against the null that revisions to US macro-series are zero-mean. Hence our tests should have power
to reject if respondents attempted to forecast revisions.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that the responses of professional forecasters of the US SPF are consistent with
the sticky information model of expectations formation. Our approach requires that individual
respondents seek to provide sets of forecasts which are consistent in the sense that the forecasts
of the quarters are consistent with the annual level. This holds by construction in the national
accounts data, yet need not be true of the forecasts if the forecasts are optimal for an asymmetric
loss function, for example. To the extent that adding upis testable, we nd little evidence that
it does not hold. Our approach also requires that agents do not attempt to forecast revisions to
the o¢ cial data releases. Again, to the extent that this is testable, there is no evidence to suggest
that agents do not take the o¢ cial data at face value. Under these assumptions we can deduce
that agents are using outdated estimates of past data if there is a negative correlation between
the discrepancy (between the annual forecast and the quarterly values) and data revisions to past
quarterly data. We nd signicantly negative correlations for half the macro-variables we consider
based on returns to third-quarter surveys, but much less evidence in favour of the sticky-information
hypothesis for the returns to the fourth-quarter surveys. However, our explanation for the ndings
for the fourth-quarter surveys is not inconsistent with the hypothesis. It is that the nature of the
revisions series relevant for these survey returns is such that our tests are likely to have low power.
Our approach to testing the sticky-information hypothesis has the virtue of being simple. It does
not require knowledge of, or that we make assumptions about, the models or forecasting methods
that agents use to generate their expectations. Some may dismiss this hypothesis out of hand on
15
the grounds that it is unreasonable to assume that professional forecasters would not pay attention
to the latest releases of data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Be that as it may, in the absence
of an alternative explanation for the negative correlations between the discrepancies and revisions,
we propose the sticky-information hypothesis as a possible explanation of this phenomenon.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Variables in the SPF
Variable SPF code RTDSM code
Nominal GDP (GNP) NGDP NOUTPUT
GDP price index PGDP P
(implicit deator, GNP deator)
Real GDP (GNP) RGDP ROUTPUT
Real personal consumption RCONSUM RCON
Real nonresidential xed investment RNRESIN RINVBF
Real residential xed investment RRESINV RINVRESID
Real federal government expenditure RFEDGOV RGF
Real state and local government RSLGOV RGSL
The SPF data were downloaded from http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-
center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/. See Croushore (1993). The Real-time Date Sets for Macroecono-
mists (RTDSM) were taken from http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-
time-data/. See Croushore and Stark (2001). Both the survey data and the real-time data were downloaded
in February 2009.
19
Table 2: Distributions of scaled discrepancies by survey quarter
Percentiles
SPF code # 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
First quarter surveys
NGDP 650 -0.049 -0.022 -0.005 0.000 0.005 0.043 0.207
PGDP 640 -0.070 -0.041 -0.012 0.000 0.023 0.077 0.221
RGDP 648 -0.083 -0.028 -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.029 0.071
RCONSUM 621 -0.055 -0.029 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.052
RNRESIN 616 -0.197 -0.052 -0.004 0.000 0.007 0.069 0.157
RRESINV 618 -0.231 -0.081 -0.011 0.000 0.013 0.127 0.382
RFEDGOV 594 -0.214 -0.071 -0.007 0.000 0.012 0.095 0.214
RSLGOV 596 -0.137 -0.045 -0.005 0.000 0.008 0.080 0.163
Second quarter surveys
NGDP 731 -0.083 -0.025 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.033 0.107
PGDP 729 -0.073 -0.040 -0.015 0.000 0.022 0.052 0.215
RGDP 737 -0.046 -0.027 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.047
RCONSUM 713 -0.062 -0.026 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.027 0.052
RNRESIN 702 -0.185 -0.051 -0.004 0.000 0.010 0.103 0.240
RRESINV 700 -0.278 -0.080 -0.013 0.000 0.017 0.151 0.419
RFEDGOV 675 -0.213 -0.080 -0.011 0.000 0.011 0.080 0.423
RSLGOV 675 -0.120 -0.047 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.080 0.213
Third quarter surveys
NGDP 736 -0.096 -0.026 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.044 0.180
PGDP 738 -0.101 -0.045 -0.018 0.000 0.024 0.053 0.151
RGDP 736 -0.043 -0.022 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.032 0.087
RCONSUM 715 -0.050 -0.025 -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.044 0.113
RNRESIN 700 -0.336 -0.108 -0.010 0.000 0.015 0.135 0.352
RRESINV 707 -0.493 -0.132 -0.016 0.000 0.025 0.180 0.718
RFEDGOV 678 -0.262 -0.108 -0.015 0.000 0.015 0.128 0.340
RSLGOV 682 -0.183 -0.073 -0.008 0.000 0.011 0.071 0.214
Fourth quarter surveys
NGDP 796 -0.051 -0.023 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.027 0.057
PGDP 796 -0.106 -0.046 -0.021 0.000 0.017 0.044 0.132
RGDP 803 -0.046 -0.025 -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.035
RCONSUM 771 -0.046 -0.028 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.031 0.048
RNRESIN 758 -0.253 -0.082 -0.009 0.000 0.008 0.069 0.193
RRESINV 755 -0.364 -0.119 -0.014 0.000 0.015 0.124 0.412
RFEDGOV 728 -0.212 -0.096 -0.015 0.000 0.011 0.095 0.252
RSLGOV 734 -0.105 -0.041 -0.007 0.000 0.009 0.055 0.113
The rst-quarter discrepancies are scaled as 100  i;t;1=yt;1t 1;4; the second-quarter as 100  i;t;2=yt;2t;1 ; the
third-quarter as 100 i;t;3=yt;2t;1 , and the fourth-quarter as 100 i;t;4=yt;3t;2 .
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Table 3: Tests of the null of attentiveness for the third and fourth quarter survey forecasts
No scaling Scaled
0
1
p0=0
p1=0
p0=0
p1=0
0
1
p0=0
p1=0
Third quarter surveys
NGDP 0.798 0.677 0.651 0.018 0.451
0.052 0.201 0.163 0.065 0.131
PGDP 0.009 0.489 0.529 0.011 0.269
0.015 0.528 0.565 -0.023 0.298
RGDP 0.110 0.725 0.778 0.004 0.502
-0.016 0.002 0.017 -0.024 0.004
RCONSUM 0.081 0.779 0.795 0.005 0.407
-0.020 0.015 0.027 -0.021 0.012
RNRESIN 0.014 0.942 0.942 0.032 0.278
-0.007 0.235 0.234 0.004 0.706
RRESINV -0.011 0.897 0.896 0.010 0.756
-0.030 0.029 0.026 -0.031 0.033
RFEDGOV 0.166 0.075 0.086 0.050 0.065
0.007 0.630 0.645 -0.002 0.919
RSLGOV 0.062 0.648 0.510 0.000 0.979
-0.019 0.128 0.017 -0.018 0.175
Fourth quarter surveys
NGDP -0.925 0.457 0.690 0.004 0.835
-0.021 0.348 0.615 -0.011 0.679
PGDP 0.009 0.473 0.359 0.007 0.379
0.002 0.696 0.599 0.002 0.636
RGDP -0.590 0.058 0.072 -0.009 0.098
0.002 0.161 0.189 0.002 0.277
RCONSUM -0.476 0.140 0.092 -0.014 0.119
0.006 0.026 0.011 0.007 0.110
RNRESIN -0.422 0.042 0.091 -0.035 0.229
0.013 0.038 0.088 0.011 0.198
RRESINV -0.063 0.478 0.473 -0.005 0.938
0.006 0.590 0.586 0.016 0.521
RFEDGOV -0.026 0.742 0.779 0.008 0.660
0.001 0.797 0.827 0.000 0.934
RSLGOV 0.061 0.618 0.621 0.010 0.437
-0.001 0.816 0.817 -0.002 0.707
The entries are based on regression equations (7) and (8), respectively, for the third and fourth-quarter
surveys. We report the estimates and individual p-values that the corresponding coe¢ cients are zero, along
with the p-values based on corrected standard errors. The scaled regressions are of 100  i;t;3=yt;2t;1 on
100

yt;3t;1   yt;2t;1

=yt;2t;1 and of 100 i;t;4=yt;3t;2 on 100

yt;4t;2   yt;3t;2

=yt;3t;2 for the third and fourth quarter
surveys, respectively. For the regressions in the scaled variables, we report the estimates and corrected
p-values. [p0=0 denotes a corrected p-value.]
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Table 4: Summary statistics of data revision series
Third-quarter revisions Fourth-quarter revisions
All fourth-quarter revisions Excluding 1993 and 1999 revisions
Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
NGDP 0.053 0.625 0.232 0.640 0.066 0.151
PGDP 0.089 0.420 -0.290 1.641 0.008 0.113
RGDP -0.055 0.726 0.558 2.362 0.057 0.133
RCONSUM -0.052 0.783 0.451 2.024 0.034 0.115
RNRESIN -0.458 2.715 0.905 3.027 0.234 0.510
RRESINV -0.237 2.425 0.532 2.475 -0.024 1.034
RFEDGOV -0.303 1.201 0.782 3.353 0.114 0.710
RSLGOV 0.077 1.120 0.618 2.647 0.027 0.211
The revisions are all scaled - divided by the earlier estimate and multiplied by 100. The third-quarter
revisions are

y3t;1   y2t;1
	
and the fourth-quarter revisions are

y4t;2   y3t;2
	
.
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Table 5: Time series of fourth-quarter revisions,

y4t;2   y3t;2
	
NGDP PGDP RGDP RCONSUM RNRESIN RRESINV RFEDGOV RSLGOV
1981 0.167 0.080 0.086 -0.052 1.003 -0.830 -0.549 -0.055
1982 -0.072 -0.180 0.108 -0.136 -0.892 2.296 0.823 0.000
1983 -0.052 -0.294 0.243 0.010 0.742 2.714 -0.508 0.287
1984 -0.047 0.039 -0.085 0.235 0.148 -1.935 -0.404 0.112
1985 -0.010 -0.046 0.036 -0.091 0.182 -1.774 -0.689 0.437
1986 -0.160 -0.043 -0.117 0.058 0.440 -0.207 1.169 0.218
1987 -0.083 -0.054 -0.029 -0.048 0.852 -0.606 1.931 -0.413
1988 0.352 0.379 -0.028 0.186 0.204 -0.629 1.937 0.066
1989 0.131 -0.077 0.209 0.208 0.235 0.371 0.674 0.086
1990 -0.152 0.042 -0.195 0.135 0.375 0.661 0.261 -0.189
1991 -0.144 0.086 -0.230 -0.249 0.931 -0.522 0.113 -0.208
1992 0.146 0.107 0.039 0.058 0.586 0.897 -0.772 -0.089
1993 1.945 0.294 1.646 1.018 3.434 4.141 1.439 2.793
1994 0.094 0.002 0.092 0.020 -0.182 0.000 -0.830 0.206
1995 0.260 0.068 0.192 0.213 -0.118 0.136 0.062 0.134
1996 0.093 0.005 0.109 -0.094 0.806 0.249 0.212 0.087
1997 0.369 0.088 0.279 0.032 -0.101 0.432 -0.411 -0.037
1998 0.106 0.004 0.101 0.073 0.305 0.395 0.066 -0.036
1999 2.844 -8.642 12.494 10.717 15.831 11.379 17.484 13.819
2000 0.085 -0.028 0.108 0.016 -0.961 -0.640 -0.054 -0.399
2001 -0.147 -0.037 -0.106 0.092 -0.272 -0.342 0.054 -0.215
2002 0.068 0.018 0.048 -0.028 -0.211 -0.541 0.016 -0.146
2003 0.236 0.009 0.222 0.117 0.109 0.122 0.090 0.327
2004 0.070 0.007 0.062 0.131 0.818 0.231 0.000 -0.033
2005 0.015 0.039 -0.025 0.015 -0.039 0.234 0.259 0.048
2006 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.408 -1.315 -0.284 0.264
2007 0.094 -0.013 0.106 0.035 0.668 -0.708 -0.173 0.032
2008 0.267 0.015 0.229 -0.074 0.035 0.681 -0.025 0.212
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Table 6: Tests of adding upfor the rst and second quarter survey forecasts
No scaling Scaled
0 p0=0 p

0=0
0 p

0=0
First quarter surveys
NGDP 3.171 0.009 0.026 0.031 0.884
PGDP 0.024 0.154 0.225 -0.012 0.123
RGDP 1.227 0.403 0.419 0.214 0.333
RCONSUM -0.024 0.948 0.950 -0.654 0.207
RNRESIN 0.070 0.756 0.804 -0.155 0.074
RRESINV 0.069 0.544 0.512 0.004 0.902
RFEDGOV 0.228 0.463 0.472 -0.816 0.253
RSLGOV -0.002 0.984 0.985 -0.252 0.178
Second quarter surveys
NGDP 1.289 0.373 0.369 0.030 0.920
PGDP 0.037 0.012 0.020 -0.001 0.846
RGDP -0.494 0.115 0.082 -0.074 0.710
RCONSUM -0.384 0.144 0.074 -0.230 0.378
RNRESIN -0.117 0.592 0.657 -0.088 0.273
RRESINV -0.221 0.144 0.157 -0.077 0.222
RFEDGOV 0.119 0.197 0.324 -0.257 0.113
RSLGOV 0.122 0.190 0.175 -0.227 0.314
The entries are based on regressions of i;t;1 and i;t;2 on an intercept (for the rst and second surveys,
respectively). We report the estimates of the intercept and the p-value that the population value is zero,
as well as p-value based on corrected standard errors. The results for the scaled regressions are of 100 
i;t;1=y
t;1
t 1;4 and of 100  i;t;2=yt;2t;1 on an intercept, for the rst and second quarter surveys, respectively.
Reported are estimates and corrected p-values. [p0=0 denotes a corrected p-value.]
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Table 7: O¢ cial gures for the previous quarter and respondentsestimates
0 p0=0
First quarter surveys
NGDP 0.031 0.884
PGDP -0.012 0.123
RGDP 0.214 0.333
RCONSUM -0.654 0.207
RNRESIN -0.155 0.074
RRESINV 0.004 0.902
RFEDGOV -0.816 0.253
RSLGOV -0.252 0.178
Second quarter surveys
NGDP 0.030 0.920
PGDP -0.001 0.846
RGDP -0.074 0.710
RCONSUM -0.230 0.378
RNRESIN -0.088 0.273
RRESINV -0.077 0.222
RFEDGOV -0.257 0.113
RSLGOV -0.227 0.314
Third quarter surveys
NGDP 0.076 0.796
PGDP -0.002 0.850
RGDP 0.000 1.000
RCONSUM -0.053 0.592
RNRESIN 0.092 0.420
RRESINV -0.093 0.311
RFEDGOV -0.333 0.059
RSLGOV -0.289 0.224
Fourth quarter surveys
NGDP 0.297 0.591
PGDP 0.011 0.253
RGDP -0.098 0.502
RCONSUM -0.038 0.569
RNRESIN -0.115 0.382
RRESINV 0.022 0.438
RFEDGOV -0.031 0.752
RSLGOV 0.027 0.648
The entries for survey quarter q are based on a regression of yt;qt;q 1   yi;t;q 1;q on an intercept, to test
whether the o¢ cial estimate for the quarter before the survey quarter (q   1) diverges systematically from
the respondentsestimates of those quarters. The p-values are based on correctedstandard errors: see the
main text.
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7 Appendix: The estimation of the pooled regression.
To get the correctstandard errors for the regression (7) or (8) we adapt the approach of Keane
and Runkle (1990) and Bonham and Cohen (2001) as follows. We assume that for an individual i:
E

"2i;t

= 20
and that for any pair of individuals i, j:
E ["it"jt] = 
2
0:
We follow Keane and Runkle (1990) and estimate 20 and 
2
0 from the residuals of the pooled OLS
regression (which imposes microhomogeneity: the same intercepts and slope parameters over all
individuals), whereas Bonham and Cohen (2001) use the residuals from separate regressions for
each individual. Hence:
^20 =
1
T
NX
i=1
X
ti
"^2i;ti
where ti runs over all the surveys to which i responded, Ti is the number of forecasts made by i,
T =
PN
i=1 Ti. Similarly:
^
2
0 =
1
T
NX
i=1
NX
j=1;
j 6=i
X
tij
"^i;tij "^j;tij
where tij runs over all the surveys to which i and j responded, Tij is the number of such forecasts,
and T =
PN
i=1
PN
j=1;j 6=i Tij .
We can then construct the estimator ^ of  = E (""0), where " = ["1;1 "1;2 : : : "1;T ; : : : ; "N;1 "N;2 : : : "N;T ]0,
using ^20 and ^
2
0. Write the model as:
Y = X + "
where Y and X are ordered conformably with " (all the time observations on individual 1, then on
individual 2 etc.) and where X has two columns, the rst being the intercept, and  = (0 1)
0. ^
is obtained by deleting the rows of Y and X corresponding to missing observations (as in the
calculation of the "^i;t residuals). The covariance matrix for ^ is given by the usual formula
(X 0X) 1X 0^X (X 0X) 1 where X is again compressed to eliminate missing values, and the corre-
sponding rows (and equivalent columns) are deleted from ^.
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